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1 Introduction 
Previous work finds a relationship between debt maturity and the legal, financial, and 
economic environment. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) report 
evidence of systematic differences across countries in the maturity of debt contracts for 
publicly traded firms. Fan et al. (working paper) who examine the capital structure and debt 
maturity choices of listed firms in 39 countries show that capital structure is determined more 
by the country in which the firm is located than by the industry sector it operates in. More 
recently, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) find that factors related to debt are influenced more by the 
country’s institutional structure than those related to equity, while Hall et al. (2004) report 
that although, capital structure of SMEs can for a large part be explained by firm specific 
determinants, the effect of these determinants varies by country. However, which country 
specific determinants do affect capital structure of SMEs still remains unclear. 
In this paper we use a unique sample of 3366 SMEs from 19 European countries to 
examine the influence of cross country differences on debt maturity for micro, small and 
medium enterprises. As mentioned above the literature reports evidence of a relationship 
between country specific determinants and debt maturity for publicly traded firms, but what 
the effect of these determinants is on debt maturity for SMEs is an unexplored area. This 
knowledge seems especially important in light of the ongoing process of the European 
unification. If country specific characteristics influence SME loan structure and hence access 
to finance, the impact of policy changes on European level could vary significantly for SMEs 
located in different countries across Europe.  
We first examine the impact of cross country differences on debt maturity while 
controlling for firm specific characteristics. Our results show that cross country differences 
significantly explain the debt maturity structure of SMEs. In order to understand these country 
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differences we analyze determinants of the different components of debt maturity. We 
examine the country’s legal environment, institutional environment, banking structure, and 
economic situation.  
Our results indicate that debt maturity is a function of the legal and institutional 
environment in which the firm operates. More specifically, firms in countries with high 
property rights that protect its creditors or enforce the existing laws are more likely to obtain 
long-term bank debt. In addition, firms that operate in a country with a healthy economic 
outlook are also able to obtain longer term financing. The influence of the legal and 
institutional environment seems to be more important for micro firm lending, whereas firm 
specific characteristics determine the length of the loan for medium size firms. 
 We also provide insight on the effect of the country’s legal origin on debt maturity for 
SMEs. Bank debt maturity of small firms in countries under German civil law and 
Scandinavian civil law is significantly longer than for firms operating under English common 
law, while debt maturity for firms in French civil law countries is significantly shorter. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous literature 
and provides the motivation for our study, Section 3 presents the data and method, Section 4 
presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
In addition to credit risk, informational asymmetries and other firm-bank specific 
factors, the choice of debt maturity might be dependent of the country specific characteristics 
where the contracting takes place. Many studies report a significant influence of a country’s 
legal, financial, and economic environment on the defining features of financial securities. For 
example, debt entitles creditors the power to repossess collateral when the company fails to 
make promised payments however, this view is not complete. It ignores the effect that this 
right also depends on the legal rules of the country where the securities are issued. La Porta et 
 3 
al. (1998), show that law and the quality of its enforcement are potentially important 
determinants of what rights security holders have and how well these rights are protected. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 1999) argue that short-term financing is more 
frequently used than long-term financing when the legal system is inefficient or costly to use. 
They report that large firms in countries with effective legal systems have more long-term 
debt relative to assets, and their debt is of longer maturity. For firms of smaller size these 
relations are weaker. Fan et al. (working paper) come to similar conclusions.  
Not only the legal environment, but also the structure of the banking sector and the 
economic situation seems to play a crucial role in determining a firm’s capital structure. 
However, the evidence is not conclusive. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that in 
countries with a large banking sector, firms have less short-term debt and debt with longer 
maturities. This in contrast with Fan et al. (working paper) who find evidence that debt 
maturity is negatively associated with the size of the banking sector. As for the economic 
situation, if we assume that the firm’s financing needs for long-term debt depends on its 
growth rate and if the investment opportunities in an economy are correlated with this growth 
rate, one might expect a relationship between the growth rate of individual firms and the 
development of the economy. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) show that debt 
maturity is negatively related to inflation and positively related to the level of economic 
development. Whereas Fan et al. (working paper) suggests that these factors are unrelated to 
the maturity of loans. 
 Although, many studies report on the relationship between country specific 
characteristics and capital structure, little is known about this relationship for SMEs. We 
contribute to this line of literature by specifically examining the effect of country specific 
characteristics on debt maturity of small and medium enterprises in 19 European countries. In 
light of the ongoing process of the European unification it is important to know if, and how, 
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SMEs are affected by country specific differences in their legal, institutional and economic 
environment. This knowledge allows policy makers to make predictions about changes in 
access to SME financing due to proposed policy changes, such as Basel II.  
 
3 Data and Method 
3.1 Data 
The initial sample uses several data sources. First, country-level information is 
obtained from La Porta et al. (1998), the Conference on Bank Concentration and Competition, 
the United Nations Statistics Division and the Heritage Foundation. 
Second, firm specific variables are obtained from the 2002 ENSR Survey on Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Observatory of European SMEs, provided by the EIM 
Business and Policy Research in the Netherlands.1 From the 7669 checked and approved 
interviews that are available in the ENSR Survey 2002, we selected the 3366 observations that 
contain information about the debt maturity of the individual firms. In table I we provide the 
distribution of the sample by countries and sectors. The number of firms per country ranges 
from 47 in Liechtenstein, to 314 in Italy. As for the nine activity sectors considered in the 
survey, the lowest representation corresponds to the Repair and Hotels/Catering industries 
with 82 and 176 observations respectively, whereas 486 and 607 firms belong to the 
Manufacturing and Construction industries respectively. In fact, Table I shows that in our 
sample the latter, in terms of percentage of firms, are the main activities in 10 out of nineteen 
countries (Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Spain, and the UK). 
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3.2 Method  
To assess the impact of country specific characteristics on bank-debt maturity we 
estimate regressions in the following form:  
 
ii5i4i3i2i10        BSS  LE   εβββββα ++++++= FSCIEESBDM i      (1) 
 
Where i index firm i; iBDM  is the bank-debt maturity for firm i; iLE  is the vector of legal  
environment variables, iBSS  is a vector of banking sector structure variables; iES  is the 
vector of economic situation variables, iEI  is a vector of institutional environment variables; 
iCFS  represents the set of firm-specific control variables and iε  is the residual. 
 
3.2.1 The dependent variable  
To create the dependent variable we utilize the ENSR Survey in which managers are 
asked the term for the largest loan the firm has received from any bank during the last 3 years. 
The answers are categorized as follows: (1) less than 1 month, (2) 1 to 6 months, (3) 6 months 
to 1 year, (4) 1 to 3 years, (5) 3 to 5 years, and (5) 5 years or longer. Using these answers we 
build a dummy variable, bank-debt maturity, which is given a value of one when the debt 
maturity longer than one year and zero otherwise.2 
 Table II, panel A gives an overview of debt maturity by country ranked in ascending 
order. The average ranks from 4.16 (Italy), the shortest average maturity, to 5.50 (Norway), 
the longest.  In panel B debt maturity is shown by firm size. Small firms have on average 
shorter debt maturity (4.70), while large firms have on average longer debt maturity (5.10).  
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3.2.2. The independent variables  
In this section we describe the explanatory variables utilized in our posterior analysis of 
debt maturity. Table III provides detailed definitions of all the variables.  
 
Country specific characteristics 
To analyze the effect of country specific characteristics on debt maturity, we include 
several variables in our regressions based on the legal, institutional and economic 
environment.  
We use the variables creditor rights, law & order, and legal efficiency to account for 
the differences in the legal environment. A country’s legal origin determines its commercial 
laws. Commercial laws basically come from two broad traditions: common law, which is 
English in origin, and civil law which derives from Roman law. Within the civil tradition, 
commercial laws originate from three major families: French, German and Scandinavian.3  
La Porta et. Al (1998) identify two general creditor strategies which deal with 
defaulting firms, being liquidation and reorganization. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) we utilize a variable creditor rights which tabulate scores in both, 
reorganization as well as liquidation.  
Debt maturity could also be influenced by the quality of legal system enforcement. La 
Porta et al. (1998) find that high quality of legal system enforcement could substitute for weak 
rules since active and well-functioning courts can step in and rescue investors abused by firm 
management. Similar to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) we define two indicators of 
the strength of enforcement of creditor rights which we call law & order and legal efficiency.4 
The first is an assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the 
country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). This index ranges from zero to 
10. Low levels of the score denote less reliance on the legal system to mediate disputes. The 
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second indicator, legal efficiency, is an index produced by the country risk rating agency 
Business International Corporation. It is an assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the 
legal environment as it affects business and ranges from zero to ten, with lower scores 
indicating lower efficiency levels. The predicted sign of the legal environment variables is 
positive, because we expect firms in countries with more creditor rights and in countries with 
higher quality of legal enforcement to obtain loans of longer maturity.  
To proxy the banking sector structure we utilize the variables private credit and 
banking concentration. Private credit is measured by claims on the private sector by deposit 
money banks to GDP. This is a measure of the development of the financial intermediaries 
that isolate credit issued to the private sector as opposed to credit to governments and public 
enterprises. Banking concentration equals the fraction of bank assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks in each country. Based on both the theory and the empirical evidence we 
have presented in the previous section, we can expect either a positive or negative relationship 
between the level of activity and the degree of concentration of the banking sector and the 
debt maturity of small firms.  
To test the influence of the state of the economy on the debt maturity we create three 
variables, (1) GDP capita, (2) GDP growth, and (3) inflation. GDP capita is measured as real 
GDP per capita, averaged over the period 1990-2000 and expressed in 1990 US dollars, GDP 
growth equals the average rate of real GDP growth, averaged over the same period as before, 
and inflation equals the log difference of the GDP deflator over 1990-2000. The state of the 
economy could influence the debt maturity structure in two ways. On the one hand, the firm’s 
need for long-term financing may depends on its growth opportunities which, in turn may be 
driven by the overall economic development. On the other hand, a low level of inflation may 
facilitate the issuance of longer-term contracts. We expect a positive relation between the 
economic development and the debt maturity of loans, i.e. a positive sign on the coefficients 
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of GDP capita and GDP growth, and negative relation between the level of inflation and the 
debt maturity of firms. 
Similar to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003) we also define economic freedom and property 
rights as indicators of a country’s overall institutional environment. Economic freedom is a 
composite index of 10 institutional factors determining economic freedom that comes from 
the Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation. This index ranges from 1 to 5, with 
large values implying greater protection of freedoms. Economic freedom is highest in U.K., at 
4.13, and lowest in Greece, at 3.18. The variable property rights is an indicator of the 
protection of private property rights that comes from the Economic Freedom Index of the 
Heritage Foundation. This index ranges from 1 to 5. Higher values signify greater protection 
of private property rights. This index only takes on the values 4 or 5 for the countries in our 
sample. The expected sign on the coefficients is ambiguous. Bianco et al. (2002), show that 
improvements in the institutional environment increase the value of collateral for bank loans 
and thus reduce the risk of existing borrowers. Hence, a positive relation between these 
variables and bank debt maturity is expected. However, such improvements can extend the 
credit market to low-grade borrowers and thereby raise the average risk of loans. Banks might 
react to this by shortening the terms of the loan to reduce risk. 
 
Firm specific characteristics 
To account for sample heterogeneity we include several firm specific control variables 
in our models. Firm size is one of the known determinants of debt maturity. To proxy for firm 
size we use the number of employees working in the firm. This variable is coded from 1 to 3, 
where 1 represents firms with 0-9 employees, 2 are firms with 10-49 employees and 3 are 
firms with 50-249 employees, or what we respectively call micro, small and medium firms. 
The variable age reflects the number of years that the firm has been in operation. It ranges 
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from 1 to 4, with 1 being less than two years in operation, 2 representing two to five years, 3 
being six to ten years, and 4 more than ten years in operation. The variable debt is the total 
amount of firm liabilities to all its banks and used to proxy for firm leverage. It ranges from 1 
to 6, with higher values indicating higher leverage. Finally, to proxy the firm’s financial 
access we include the variable availability, which equals one when the firm received all the 
loans requested from its bank(s) in the last 3 years and zero otherwise.  
 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive and univariate statistics 
Table IV reports the mean scores of the country specific variables by country. There 
seems to be considerable cross-country variation in our sample. For example, Denmark, 
Germany and United Kingdom do have strong protection laws in place, while creditors in 
France, Finland, Greece, Ireland Portugal and Switzerland are hardly at all protected by law. 
The quality of legal enforcement is weakest in the majority of the French-civil-law countries 
which are France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, whereas the Scandinavian-civil-law 
countries demonstrate the highest quality of law enforcement. 
The ratio of deposit money of banks to GDP ranges from the highest 1.69 in 
Switzerland to the lowest 0.26 in Greece. As for the percentage of assets held by the three 
largest banks, we find the higher rates in Iceland, Netherlands and Sweden, 87%, 81% and 
78% respectively, whereas lower levels of concentration corresponds to Luxembourg, Italy, 
Germany and France, respectively  21%, 30%, 32% and 33%. 
The most developed countries in our sample – in terms of GDP per capita – are 
Luxembourg, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, whereas on the other side of the spectrum are 
Portugal and Greece. The GDP growth is highest in Ireland, at 7.3%, and lowest in 
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Switzerland, at 1.13%. As for the level of inflation, it ranges from -0.32 in Finland to 0.14 in 
U.K. 
Table V shows the mean (median) scores of the country and firm specific variables for 
the full sample and the sub-samples based on legal origin.5 We test if the means of the sub-
samples are significantly different from each other. They differ significantly (α=0.01) for 
almost all of the country specific variables, indicating that the legal, economic, and 
institutional environment variables vary among countries with different legal origin. French 
law countries score lowest on the legal environment and institutional variables, while 
creditors in common law countries enjoy the highest protection and the legal efficiency is 
highest in Scandinavian law countries.     
 
4.2 Regression Analyses of Bank-Debt Maturity 
 In model 1 of table VI, we first analyze the existence cross-country differences in the 
use of long-term debt by regressing the variable bank debt maturity on eighteen country 
dummies – we don’t include a dummy for The Netherlands, which is our base category. The 
results indicate the existence of significant cross-country differences in bank-debt maturity, 
appearing to be two groups of countries. On one side of the spectrum, we find negative and 
significant coefficients for France, Greece, Italy, and Portugal indicating that SMEs in those 
countries obtain loans of shorter maturity than firms in the Netherlands. On the other side, 
SMEs in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland and Norway are more likely to obtain 
long-term debt. It seems that legal origin elucidates the differences in the use of short-term 
debt between these countries. Although, all of them are civil-law countries, they belong to 
different families. Those with shorter-term debt – France, Greece, Italy and Portugal – are 
classified as French-civil-law countries, whereas the others are either German-civil-law or 
Scandinavian-civil-law countries. According to La Porta et al. (1998) German-civil-law and 
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Scandinavian countries give creditors stronger protection and have higher quality of law 
enforcement than French-civil-law countries. Stronger creditor protection reduces risk for 
lending institutions and may increase their willingness to lengthen the maturity of loans, 
explaining why firms in German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries are more likely to 
obtain long-term debt. 
 In model 2 of table VI we group the countries according to their legal origin and 
regresses bank-debt maturity on these four groups, using French-common-law as our 
reference group.6 Consistent with the findings of la Porta et al. (1998) we find that firms in 
countries under German-civil-law and Scandinavian-civil-law have significantly more long 
term debt (α=0.01) than firms operating under French-civil-law, while debt maturity for firms 
in Common-law countries is significantly longer at the 10 percent level.   
 Now that we have established the existence of cross-country differences in the use of 
long-term debt, we examine the origin of such variations using our set of country-level 
variables. According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), the problem when 
explaining differences in financial structures across nations by institutional factors is that the 
development of these institutions are correlated. To avoid this endogeneity problem we 
regress bank-debt maturity on each group of country-level variables separately before 
estimating a joined model.  
In table VII, model 1 the results with regard to the legal environment are presented. 
The variables creditor rights and law & order are both significant at the 1% level. The 
expected positive signs attest that firms in countries with higher protection of creditor rights 
and more tradition for law and order obtain debt of longer maturity. This is consistent with 
our previous evidence indicating that firms in countries that protect creditors and enforce the 
law are more likely to acquire long-term debt. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) report 
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for a sample of large firms similar results for the impact of legal tradition on debt maturity, 
but not for creditor rights.  
 In Model 2 we analyze the banking sector structure variables. The evidence indicates 
that they also play an important role in determining the use of long-term debt. The coefficient 
of the variable private credit is positive and significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the 
result presented by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), this suggests that a large banking 
sector enables small firms to extend the maturity of their loans. We find also evidence that the 
higher the concentration of the banking market, the longer the maturity of the loans. The 
indicator of the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in the country is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This result confirms Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) argument about 
the positive effect of reduced credit market competition on banks’ incentives to invest in close 
relationships with their borrowers. The risk reduction induced by these relationships enables 
banks to grant debt of longer maturity to relationship borrowers than to other firms.  
 Inspection of model 3 reveals that the economic variables also explain some of the 
variation in debt maturity. The ratio of GDP to population and the rate of growth in GDP are 
both significant at the one percent level, and positively associated with long-term borrowing. 
The variable inflation has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 10% level. Consistent 
with the results reported by Fan et al. (working paper) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999), high levels of inflation seem to negatively affect the use long-term debt.  
 In model 4, we also find that higher property rights are positively associated with debt 
maturity (α=0.01), indicating that firms in countries with higher property rights are more 
likely to obtain long term debt. 
 After analyzing the association between bank-debt maturity and each group of 
country-level variables, we estimate a joined regression in model 5. Indeed, we find some 
differences compared to the results reported above, which confirms the lack of independence 
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put forward by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). The significance of the ratio of GDP 
per capita and banking concentration disappears, whereas the variable economic freedom 
becomes significant.  
In model 1 of Table VIII, we add the firm specific control variables to our country 
dummies. The results are not qualitatively affected after the inclusion of the firm specific 
control variables and also the ranking of countries in terms of bank-debt maturity remains 
unchanged with respect to our previous results. As reported in table VI we still observe that 
cross country variation is significant in explaining debt maturity of SMEs.  
In addition, all the firm specific control variables are statistically significant. 
Consistent with the liquidity risk theory (Diamond, 1991), firms with a high financial 
leverage extend the maturity of their debt in order to avoid liquidity risk associated with the 
use of short-term debt. Also consistent with the evidence presented by Heyman et al. (2003) 
and Ortiz-Molina and Penas (working paper), our results suggest that better quality firms – 
proxied by the availability of credit – are more likely to receive long-term debt. 
Regarding the size of the firm, the negative coefficient of the variable employees 
indicates that larger firms use more short-term debt. Financial theory would suggest the 
opposite relation because large firms are less exposed to asymmetric information problems 
and have more collateral to guarantee loans. However, one can also argue that large firms can 
use lower priced, short-term debt due to lower liquidity risk. In this case the relation between 
size and short-term debt is expected to be positive. The positive sign on the age coefficient 
indicates that older firms are more likely to obtain loans of longer maturity which is in line 
with our expectations because these firms are usually exposed to less asymmetric information 
problems than younger firms.  
In the second model we replace the country dummies for the legal origin dummies. 
Again, the results do not change for both, the legal origin dummies and the firm specific 
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control variables. Consistent with what we found in table VI, firms in countries under 
German-civil-law and Scandinavian-civil-law have significantly more long term debt 
(α=0.01) than firms operating under French-civil-law, while debt maturity for firms in 
Common-law countries is significantly longer at the 10 percent level.  
Model 3 explains the nature of the observed cross country variation by analyzing the 
determinants of the different components of debt maturity while controlling for firm specific 
characteristics. The results are qualitative the same as in table VII.  
 Given the special characteristics of small firms which are the most opaque, we 
bifurcate our sample into the smallest firms, i.e. micro firms with maximum 9 employees, and 
medium size firms, i.e. between 50 and 249 employees and regress debt maturity on the firm 
and country-level variables. The results are reported in table IX.  
Interestingly, the significance of the country-level variables remains qualitatively the 
same for micro firms, while the significance of the firm specific control variables disappears. 
This is exactly the opposite for the medium size firms. More specifically, creditor rights, law 
& order, GDP growth, and economic freedom are strongly statistically significant in our 
micro firm sample, whereas for medium size firms only the assessment of the law and order 
tradition is weakly significant.7 Since loans involving very small firms are more complex and 
riskier due to higher asymmetric information problems, it seems logical that banks rely more 
on the legal, economic and institutional elements when determining the length of the loan 
agreement. This result seems to be in line with the findings of Jõeveer (working paper), who 
shows that country factors are more important for small firms than large firms when 
explaining leverage variation.  
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5 Summary and Conclusion 
Using a unique sample of 3366 SMEs from 19 European countries, we examine the 
influence of cross country differences on debt maturity for micro, small and medium size 
enterprises. It is important to know how SME debt maturity is affected by country specific 
differences in their legal, institutional and economic environment, because this knowledge 
allows policy makers to predict the impact of proposed policy changes on access to SME 
financing. Many studies report on the relationship between country specific characteristics 
and debt maturity for publicly traded firms however, little is known about this relationship for 
small and medium enterprises.  
We analyze determinants of the different components of debt maturity by examining 
the country’s legal environment, institutional environment, banking structure, and economic 
situation, while controlling for firm specific characteristics. A very interesting finding is that 
even after the inclusion of the firm specific control variables, the country specific factors 
remain significantly important in explaining loan maturity. Our results indicate that debt 
maturity is a function of the legal and institutional environment. More specifically, firms in 
countries with high property rights that protect creditors or enforce the existing laws are more 
likely to obtain long-term bank debt. In addition, SMEs that operate in a country with a 
healthy economic outlook are also able to obtain longer term financing. We also provide 
inside on the effect of the country’s legal origin on debt maturity for SMEs. Small firms in 
countries under German and Scandinavian civil law and English common law are more likely 
to obtain bank loans of longer maturity compared to SMEs in countries under French civil 
law.  
 There is one note of caution with regard to our results. SMEs are small, privately held 
companies and therefore, are not required to provide publicly available financial statements. 
Financial information about SMEs is difficult to obtain and often has to come from survey 
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data, like in our sample. We recognize that survey data might create potential biases and 
possible measurement problems. However, we believe that our sample is large enough that, 
although cautiously, valid conclusions can be drawn. 
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Endnotes
                                               
1
 The 2002 ENSR Survey on SMEs uses a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system to collect 
data from entrepreneurs and managers within SMEs, all being independent private enterprises with less than 250 
employees in all sectors of industry in Europe. The survey was conducted from April-August 2001. To arrive at 
sufficiently reliable conclusions at the level of size classes within individual countries more than 100 interviews 
for each size class-country combination were carried out, finally resulting in 7699 completed interviews. The 
overall design and implementation of the stratification, the questionnaire and the fieldwork were done in close 
collaboration between staff from EIM Business & Policy Research in the Netherlands, partners in the ENSR 
network and Intromart. 
See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/analysis/observatory_en.htm for further information. 
2
 We also build a dummy variable which equals one if the term of the largest loan is longer than three years, and 
zero otherwise.  As a robustness test, we rerun all our  analyses using this specification as well. Results are 
qualitative the same. 
3
 According to La Porta et al (1998), Ireland and United Kingdom are common-law countries; Belgium, France, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain are French-origin; Austria, Germany and Switzerland are 
German-origin; Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are Scandinavian-origin.  
4
 We define both variables using information reported by La Porta et al. (1998). 
5
 We use the same legal origin classification as La Porta et al. (1998). The United Kingdom and Ireland are 
under English common law. Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain are under French civil law. 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland are under German civil law. Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are 
under Scandinavian civil law.  Iceland, Lichtenstein and Luxembourg are undefined and left out of the analysis. 
6
 Iceland, Lichtenstein and Luxembourg are undefined and left out of the analysis. 
7
 The signs of all the coefficients are consistent with our previous results employing the whole sample. 
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Table I 
Sample distribution by country and sector 
Country Manufacturing Construction Wholesale 
Trade 
Retail 
Trade 
Hotels/ 
Catering 
Repair Transport/ 
Communications 
Business 
Services 
Other Service 
Industries 
Total 
Austria 28 (13.79) 55 (27.09) 20 (9.85) 13   (6.40) 11   (5.42)   8 (3.94) 36 (17.73) 22 (10.84) 10   (4.93) 203 (100) 
Belgium 22   (9.61) 23 (10.04) 73 (31.88) 40 (17.47) 13   (5.68)   4 (1.75) 26 (11.35) 16   (6.99) 12   (5.24) 229 (100) 
Denmark 12 (12.64) 35 (35.71) 14 (14.29)   6   (6.12)   5   (5.10)   3 (3.06) 12 (12.24)   5   (5.10)   6   (6.12) 98 (100) 
Finland 27 (16.07) 21 (12.50) 16   (9.52) 18 (10.71)   2   (1.19)   1 (0.60) 59 (35.12)   7   (4.17) 17 (10.12) 168 (100) 
France 29 (10.21) 34 (11.97) 15   (5.28) 62 (21.83) 24   (8.45) 10 (3.52) 30 (10.56) 43 (15.14) 37 (13.03) 284 (100) 
Germany 23 (10.85) 26 (12.26) 16   (7.55) 32 (15.09) 19   (8.96)   6 (2.83) 14   (6.60) 40 (18.87) 36 (16.98) 212 (100) 
Greece 23 (12.99) 14   (7.91) 25 (14.12) 67 (37.85) 15   (8.47)   1 (0.56) 17   (9.60)   8   (4.52)   7   (3.95) 177 (100) 
Iceland 60 (29.85) 21 (10.45) 33 (16.42) 19   (9.45)   5   (2.49)   8 (3.98) 11   (5.47) 12   (5.97) 32 (15.92) 201 (100) 
Ireland 25 (20.33) 25 (20.33) 16 (13.01) 12  (9.76)   6   (4.88)   1 (0.81) 20 (16.26) 11   (8.94)   7   (5.69) 123 (100) 
Italy 82 (26.11) 35 (11.15) 30   (9.55) 35 (11.15) 20   (6.37)   8 (2.55) 16   (5.10) 30   (9.55) 58 (18.47) 314 (100) 
Liechtenstein 12 (25.53)   1   (2.13)   5 (10.64)   5 (10.64)   4   (8.51)   1 (2.13)   7 (14.89)   5 (10.64)   7 (14.89) 47 (100) 
Luxembourg 11 (10.19) 17 (15.74) 16 (14.81) 15 (13.89) 13 (12.04)   2 (1.85) 16 (14.81) 10   (9.26)   8   (7.41) 108 (100) 
Netherlands 24 (14.29) 24 (14.29) 20 (11.90) 36 (21.43)   5   (2.98)   2 (1.19) 22 (13.10) 27 (16.07)   8   (4.76) 168 (100) 
Norway 20 (12.12) 60 (36.36) 19 (11.52) 13   (7.88)   6   (3.64)   4 (2.42) 20 (12.12) 10   (6.06) 13   (7.88) 165 (100) 
Portugal 20 (13.51)   8   (5.41) 18 (12.16) 37 (25.00)   4   (2.70)   3 (2.03) 18 (12.16) 37 (25.00)   3   (2.03) 148 (100) 
Spain 85 (35.42) 22   (9.17) 14   (5.83) 32 (13.33) 12   (5.00)   3 (1.25) 25 (10.42) 29 (12.08) 18   (7.50) 240 (100) 
Sweden 29 (21.80) 16 (12.03)   6   (4.51)   5   (3.76)   2   (1.50)   8 (6.02) 46 (34.59)   9   (6.77) 12   (9.02) 133 (100) 
Switzerland 17 (13.60) 13 (10.40) 32 (25.60)   7   (5.60)   7   (5.60)   3 (2.40) 29 (23.20)   9   (7.20)   8   (6.40) 125 (100) 
UK 58 (26.01) 36 (16.14) 15   (6.73) 15   (6.73)   3   (1.35)   6 (2.69) 19   (8.52) 32 (14.35) 39 (17.49) 223 (100) 
Total 607 486 403 469 176 82 443 362 338 3366 
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Table II 
Overview of debt maturity by country and firm size 
Country N Average < 1 month  1 to 6 
months  
6 to 12 
months 
1 to 3 years 3 to 5 years  > 5 years 
Panel A:  Debt Maturity by Country  
Italy  314 4.1592 11 49 30 85 67 72 
Greece  177 4.1751 2 26 39 34 24 52 
France  284 4.2535 23 32 20 51 91 67 
UK  223 4.4081 11 7 28 58 72 47 
Portugal  148 4.4324 4 19 14 32 30 49 
Liechtenstein  47 4.7021 3 1 5 11 5 22 
Switzerland  125 4.7600 1 7 17 22 27 51 
Sweden  133 4.8045 8 6 5 25 30 59 
Luxembourg  108 4.8981 2 5 9 18 26 48 
Belgium  229 4.9563 9 12 7 34 57 110 
Ireland  123 4.9756 1 4 10 22 31 55 
Netherlands  168 5.0000 11 7 6 14 39 91 
Spain  240 5.1083 0 6 20 38 54 122 
Finland  168 5.2202 1 5 3 26 45 88 
Germany  212 5.2264 4 3 6 27 60 112 
Austria  203 5.2956 0 9 6 26 37 125 
Iceland  201 5.3234 1 3 3 27 32 131 
Denmark  98 5.4898 0 2 2 9 18 67 
Norway  165 5.5030 3 3 2 12 25 120 
Total 3366  95 208 234 571 770 1488 
 
Number 
employees 
N Average < 1 month 1 to 6 
months 
6 to 12 
months 
1 to 3 years 3 to 5 years  > 5 years 
Panel B:  Debt Maturity by Firm Size  
0-9 1711 4.6984 58 112 126 334 443 638 
10-49 949 4.9115 21 58 69 147 195 459 
50-249 706 5.0637 16 38 39 90 132 391 
Total 3366  95 208 234 571 770 1488 
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Table III 
Variables descriptions and data sources 
Variable name Description and source 
Dependent variable: 
Bank debt maturity1 An indicator of the firm’s debt maturity measured as a dummy variable that takes on 
the value one when the debt maturity is longer than one year and zero otherwise. 
Country and industry dummies: 
Industry dummies91 Nine industry dummies indicating the firm main activity. Each variable takes on the 
value one if the firm belongs to one of the following sectors: Manufacturing, 
Construction, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Hotels & Catering, Repair, Transport & 
Communications, Business Services, and Other Service Industries; and zero 
otherwise. 
Country dummies Nineteen country dummies.  
Legal Environment: 
Creditor rights2 An indicator of the protection of creditor rights, calculated by adding 1 for each of 
the following conditions that the country’s bankruptcy law satisfies: (i) the country 
imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for 
reorganization; (ii) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once 
the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (iii) secured 
creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the 
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (iv) the debtor does not retain the 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index 
ranges from zero to four, with higher values indicating the existence of more creditor 
rights.  
Law & order2 An assessment of the law and order tradition in the country, produced by the country 
risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). Average of the months of April 
and October of the monthly index over the period 1982-1995. The index ranges from 
zero to 10, with higher scores denoting more tradition for law and order. 
Legal efficiency2 An assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects 
business, particularly foreign firms, averaged over the period 1980-1983. It is 
produced by the country risk rating agency Business International Corporation and it 
may be taken to represent investors’ assessments of conditions in the country in 
question. The index ranges from zero to 10, with higher values indicating higher 
efficiency levels. 
Banking Sector Structure: 
Private credit3 A measure of the financial intermediary development, calculated as claims on the 
private sector by the deposit money banks to GDP.  
Banking 
Concentration3 
A measure of the degree of concentration of the banking sector, calculated as the 
fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in the country, averaged over the 
period 1995-1999. 
Economic Situation:   
GDP capita4 GDP per capita expressed in 1990 U.S. dollars, averaged over the period 1990-2000.  
GDP growth4 Growth in GDP expressed in 1990 U.S. dollars, averaged over the 1990-2000 period. 
The average growth rate for a period of n years is derived as the geometric mean of 
the annual growth rates for that period. 
Inflation4 Rate of inflation, calculated as log difference of GDP deflator (1990=100) over 1990-
2000 period. 
 
Institutional Environment: 
Economic freedom5 A composite of 10 institutional factors determining economic freedom: trade policy, 
fiscal burden of government, government intervention in the economy, monetary 
policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, 
property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It is calculated as 6 minus the 
economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation, averaged over the period 1997-
2000. The index ranges from 1 to 5, with a high scores signifying greater freedom. 
Property rights5 An indicator of the protection of private property rights, calculated as 6 minus the 
property freedom index of the Heritage Foundation, averaged over the period 1997-
2000. The index ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating higher protection 
of property rights. 
Firm Specific Characteristics: 
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Employees1 An indicator of the firm size, which takes on the values: 1 when the firm has less than 
9 employees, 2 when the number of employees is between 10 and 49, and 3 when the 
firm has more than 49 employees.  
Age1 A measure of the number of years that the firm has been in operation, which takes on 
the values: 1 when it has been less than 2 years, 2 when it has been between 2 and 5 
years, 3 when it has been between 6 and 10 years, and 4 when it has been more than 
10 years.  
Debt1 A measure of the amount of liabilities to all of the firm’s banks, which takes on the 
values: 1 when the liabilities amount to less than 89485 U.S. dollars, 2 when they do 
between 89486 and 447422, 3 when they do between 447423 and 894846, 4 when 
they do between 894847 and 2684539, 5 when they do between 2684540 and 
4474232, and 6 when the liabilities are above 4474233 U.S. dollars.  
Availability1  An indicator of the financial situation of the firm, which equals one when the firm 
got all the loans it requested from its bank(s) in the last 3 years and zero otherwise. 
Data Sources: 
1
 2002 ENSR Survey on SMEs. 
2
 La Porta, López-De Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1998). 
3
 Conference on Bank Concentration and Competition. 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/confs/042003/data.htm 
4
 United Nations Statistics Division. 
5
 Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation. 
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Table IV 
Country specific characteristics 
 
Creditor 
rights 
Law & 
Order 
Legal 
efficiency 
Private 
credit 
Banking 
Concentration 
GDP 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation Economic 
Freedom 
Property 
rights 
Austria 3 10      9.5 0.99 0.44 22636 2.59 -0.072 3.96 5 
Belgium 2 10      9.5 0.76 0.75 21289 2.25 -0.067 3.93 5 
Denmark 3 10 10 0.34 0.71 28245 2.21 -0.059 3.88 5 
Finland 1 10 10 0.51 0.75 27137 1.67 -0.319 3.87 5 
France 0   8.98  8 0.82 0.33 22407 1.93 -0.112 3.64 4 
Germany 3   9.23  9 1.14 0.32 22730 2.26 -0.078 3.72 5 
Greece 1   6.18  7 0.26 0.71  8764 2.12  0.069 3.18 4 
Iceland - - - 0.66 0.87 25066 2.54  0.038 3.80 5 
Ireland 1   7.8       8.75 0.51 0.68 17527 7.33 -0.003 4.07 5 
Italy 2   8.33      6.75 0.57 0.30 20579 1.64 -0.185 3.70 4 
Liechtenstein - - - - - 32788 1.86 -0.036 - - 
Luxembourg - - - 0.94 0.21 34850 5.49  0.033 4.07 5 
Netherlands 2 10 10 1.06 0.81 21624 3.01 -0.058 4.02 5 
Norway 2 10 10 0.61 0.61 32385 3.57 -0.003 3.70 5 
Portugal 1   8.68      5.5 0.92 0.46  8093 2.91  0.122 3.63 4 
Spain 2   7.8       6.25 0.86 0.54 14147 2.77 -0.167 3.54 4 
Sweden 2 10 10 0.41 0.78 28817 1.90 -0.199 3.79 4 
Switzerland 1 10 10 1.69 0.77 32789 1.13 -0.036 4.10 5 
UK 4   8.57 10 1.18 0.47 18802 2.25  0.138 4.13 5 
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Table V 
Univariate statistics of country and firm level variables by legal origin 
Variable Mean (median) Legal origin mean (median) Univariate t-test for difference in means 
 Full Sample UK Law Germ Law Scan Law French Law UK=Germ  UK=Scan UK=French Germ=Scan Germ=Frenc
h 
Scan=French 
Creditor 
rights 
1.88  (2.00) 2.93  (4.00) 2.54  (3.00) 1.88  (2.00) 1.43  (2.00) ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   
Law & order 9.01  (8.98) 8.30  (8.57) 9.70  (10.00) 10.00  (10.00) 8.58  (8.68) ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   
Legal 
efficiency 
8.58  (8.58) 9.56   (10.00) 9.42  (9.50) 10.00  (10.00) 7.56  (7.00) ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   
Private credit 0.80  (0.82) 0.94  (1.18) 1.21  (1.14) 0.49  (0.51) 0.74  (0.82) *** ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   
Banking 
concentration 
0.56  (0.54) 0.55  (0.47) 0.47  (0.44) 0.71  (0.75) 0.53  (0.54) *** ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   
Property 
rights 
4.61  (5.00) 5.00  (5.00) 5.00  (5.00) 4.76  (5.00) 4.25  (4.00)  ***  ***    ***   ***   ***   
Economic 
freedom 
3.79  (3.79) 4.11  (4.13) 3.90  (3.96) 3.80  (3.79) 3.67  (3.64) ***   ***   ***    ***   ***   ***   
GDP capita 22039  
(22406) 
18348  
(18802) 
25022  
(22729) 
29260  
(28816) 
17613 
(20578) 
***   ***   ***    ***   ***   ***   
GDP growth 2.57 (2.25) 4.06  (2.25) 2.12  (2.26) 2.37  (1.90) 2.28  (2.25) *** ***   ***   ***   *** *** 
Inflation -0.06  (-0.07) 0.09  (0.14) -0.07  (-0.72) -0.15  (-0.20) -0.08  (-0.11) ***   ***  ***   ***   ***   ***   
Size 1.70  (1.00) 1.57  (1.00) 1.72  (2.00) 1.95  (2.00) 1.66  (1.00) ***   ***   **  ***             ***   
Debt 2.17  (2.00) 1.72  (1.00) 2.52  (2.00) 2.46  (2.00) 2.04  (2.00) ***   ***   ***    ***   ***   
Availability 0.88  (1.00) 0.87  (1.00) 0.89  (1.00) 0.92  (1.00) 0.88  (1.00)  **               
Age 3.57  (4.00) 3.47  (4.00) 3.73  (4.00) 3.70  (4.00) 3.50  (4.00) ***    ***     ***   ***   
Debt maturity 0.16   (0) 0.18  (0) 0.10 (0) 0.07  (0) 0.22  (0) *** *** ***  *** *** 
Observations 3366 346 540 564 1560       
Statistical significance for tests of differences in means at the 10%, 5%, 1% level are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. 
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Table VI 
Logistic regressions of bank-debt maturity on country dummies 
Variable (1) (2) 
Constant 1.7918*** 
(0.2205) 
1.2515*** 
(0.0609) 
Country dummies 
Austria 0.7366** 
(0.3473) 
 
Belgium 0.1793 
(0.2988) 
 
Denmark 1.3652** 
(0.5561) 
 
Finland 1.0799*** 
(0.4074) 
 
France -0.7669*** 
(0.2583) 
 
Germany 0.9366*** 
(0.3613) 
 
Greece -1.2960*** 
(0.2695) 
 
Iceland 1.0574*** 
(0.3805) 
 
Ireland 0.1823 
(0.3529) 
 
Italy -0.8799*** 
(0.2534) 
 
Liechtenstein -0.3514 
(0.4313) 
 
Luxembourg -0.0426 
(0.3493) 
 
Norway 1.1850*** 
(0.4242) 
 
Portugal -0.6931** 
(0.2909) 
 
Spain 0.3161 
(0.3029) 
 
Sweden 0 
(0.3317) 
 
Switzerland -0.4055 
(0.3140) 
 
UK -0.4443 
(0.2757) 
 
Legal origin dummies 
Germlaw  0.9664*** 
(0.1569) 
Scanlaw  1.3207*** 
(0.0.1749) 
Comlaw  0.2901* 
(0.1537) 
Observations 3366 3010 
R2 0.07 0.06 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table VII 
Logistic regressions of bank-debt maturity on country-level variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -1.8902*** 
(0.3775) 
0.5182** 
(0.2170) 
-0.0135 
(0.2082) 
-1.8140** 
(0.8076) 
-1.9678 
(1.3060) 
Legal Environment: 
Creditor rights 0.1802*** 
(0.0518) 
   0.3252*** 
(0.0685) 
Law & order 0.2991*** 
(0.0582) 
   0.4725*** 
(0.0884) 
Legal efficiency 0.0629 
(0.0452) 
   0.0001 
(0.0978) 
Banking Sector Structure: 
Private credit  0.5149*** 
(0.1714) 
  0.5460** 
(0.2607) 
Banking 
concentration 
 1.3659*** 
(0.2494) 
  0.1781 
(0.3788) 
Economic Situation: 
GDP capita   -0.0001*** 
(0) 
 0 
(0) 
GDP growth   0.2353*** 
(0.0548) 
 0.3751*** 
(0.0698) 
Inflation   -0.8076* 
(0.4520) 
 -2.5893*** 
(0.7260) 
Institutional Environment: 
Economic 
freedom 
   -0.4590 
(0.1321) 
-2.7491*** 
(0.5152) 
Property rights    1.1506*** 
(0.1421) 
0.7968*** 
(0.2610) 
      
Observations 3010 3319 3366 3319 3010 
R2 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table VIII 
Logistic regressions of bank-debt maturity on country and firm level variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.7844* 
(0.4217) 
-0.0266 
(0.3371) 
-1.2628 
(1.9079) 
Country dummies    
Austria 0.8380* 
(0.4376) 
  
Belgium 0.3979 
(0.3977) 
  
Denmark 1.3154** 
(0.5776) 
  
Finland 1.1250** 
(0.4723) 
  
France -0.6928** 
(0.3247) 
  
Germany 0.4782 
(0.5945) 
  
Greece -1.2914*** 
(0.3378) 
  
Iceland 1.0958** 
(0.4372) 
  
Ireland 0.3599 
(0.4612) 
  
Italy -1.0158*** 
(0.3125) 
  
Liechtenstein -1.0277** 
(0.5048) 
  
Luxembourg 0.3161 
(0.4849) 
  
Norway 1.3612*** 
(0.4957) 
  
Portugal -0.5288 
(0.3811) 
  
Spain 0.0315 
(0.4709) 
  
Sweden 0.3112 
(0.3984) 
  
Switzerland -0.3596 
(0.4441) 
  
UK -0.4495 
(0.3270) 
  
Legal Origin Dummies:    
Germlaw  0.9908*** 
(0.2361) 
 
Scanlaw  1.5315*** 
(0.2070) 
 
Comlaw  0.3446* 
(0.1824) 
 
Legal Environment:    
Creditor rights   0.2097** 
(0.0957) 
Law & order   0.5733*** 
(0.1203) 
Legal efficiency   0.0221 
(0.1291) 
Banking Sector Structure:    
Private credit   -0.0470 
(0.3957) 
Banking concentration   0.2587 
(0.5494) 
Economic Situation:    
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GDP capita   -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
GDP growth   0.3160*** 
(0.0963) 
Inflation   -1.1003 
(1.0196) 
Institutional Environment:    
Economic freedom   -2.1470*** 
(0.7451) 
Property rights   0.7462** 
(0.3247) 
Firm-Specific 
Characteristics: 
   
Size -0.3657*** 
(0.1048) 
-0.3019*** 
(0.1021) 
-0.3465*** 
(0.1065) 
Age 0.1898** 
(0.0859) 
0.1820** 
(0.0857) 
0.1667* 
(0.0896) 
Debt 0.3351*** 
(0.0701) 
0.3198*** 
(0.0693) 
0.2974*** 
(0.0708) 
Availability 0.3128* 
(0.1816) 
0.4469** 
(0.1811) 
0.4272** 
(0.1858) 
 
   
Observations 2132 1872 1872 
R2 0.10 0.07 0.09 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 29 
 
Table IX 
Logistic regressions of bank-debt maturity on country and firm level variables by firm size 
Variable MICRO FIRMS 
(0-9 employees) 
MEDIUM FIRMS  
(50-249 employees) 
Constant 1.3975 
(2.9237) 
-6.6586 
(4.3467) 
Country Specific Variables:   
Legal Environment:   
Creditor rights 0.3706** 
(0.1451) 
-0.1731 
(0.2623) 
Law & order 0.6951*** 
(0.2088) 
0.4629* 
(0.2444) 
Legal efficiency -0.2264 
(0.2080) 
-0.0053 
(0.3176) 
Banking Sector Structure:   
Private credit -0.1449 
(0.5587) 
-0.3301 
(0.8662) 
Banking concentration 0.5183 
(0.8213) 
0.4910 
(1.4676) 
Economic Situation:   
GDP capita 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
GDP growth 0.4615*** 
(0.1582) 
0.1809 
(0.2063) 
Inflation 1.2174 
(1.7078) 
-0.3731 
(2.0994) 
Institutional Environment:   
Economic freedom -3.1211*** 
(1.2060) 
0.0166 
(1.6825) 
Property rights 0.8322 
(0.5622) 
0.1366 
(0.7016) 
Firm specific Characteristics:   
Age -0.0779 
(0.1153) 
0.4405* 
(0.2290) 
Debt 0.1330 
(0.1396) 
0.4125*** 
(0.1151) 
Availability 0.4068* 
(0.2471) 
0.2593 
(0.4808) 
   
Observations 902 446 
R2 0.08 0.10 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
